I put some interesting pieces for your info. Please read and think about them. We must support the efforts to punish the 1980 junta and reverse the legal system based on its 1982 constitution and fully compensate all the victims of the junta and write the most advanced constitution aiming a quantum democracy in Turkey. I will start my protest standing and sitting in front of the United Nations Building in New York City on this Friday. Please join me there to support democracy and human rights and punish crimes against humanity.
The strategy of tension (Italian: strategia della tensione) is a theory that describes how world powers divide, manipulate, and control public opinion using fear, propaganda, disinformation, psychological warfare, agents provocateurs, and false flag terrorist actions.
The theory began with allegations that the United States government and the Greek military junta of 1967–1974 supported far-right terrorist groups in Italy and Turkey, where communism was growing in popularity, to spread panic among the population who would in turn demand stronger and more dictatorial governments.
Turkey has a history of involvement in similar plots. The Turkish branch of Gladio, known as Counter-Guerrilla, allegedly followed a similar strategy in Turkey in order to justify the 1980 military coup. Turkish secret police are also believed to have instigated the bombing of the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki, Greece in 1955, leading to the Istanbul Pogrom against the Greek minority of Istanbul.
 Assaults on Cumhuriyet and the Council of State
In 2008 over a hundred people, including several generals, party officials, and a former secretary general of the National Security Council were arrested for participation in Ergenekon, an alleged clandestine, secular ultra-nationalist organization with ties to members of the country’s military and security forces. Alleged members have been indicted on charges of plotting to foment unrest, among other things by assassinating intellectuals, politicians, judges, military staff, and religious leaders, with the ultimate goal of toppling the pro-Western incumbent government in a coup that was planned to take place in 2009.
 Operation Cage Action Plan
Operation Cage Action Plan is the name given to an alleged plot by radical fringes of the Turkish secular establishment created in order to destabilize the governing Justice and Development Party party by pitting political and religious minorities against them.
1980 Turkish coup d’état
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The daily Hürriyet ran an extra edition, whose headline read “The army has seized control”
The 12 September 1980 Turkish coup d’état, headed by Chief of the General Staff General Kenan Evren, was the third coup d’état in the history of the Republic after the 1960 coup and the 1971 “Coup by Memorandum“.
The 1970s were marked by right-wing/left-wing armed conflicts, often proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. To create a pretext for a decisive intervention, the Turkish military allowed the conflicts to escalate; some say they actively adopted a strategy of tension. The violence abruptly stopped afterwards, and the coup was welcomed by some for restoring order.
In 1975 Süleyman Demirel, president of the conservative Justice Party (Turkish: Adalet Partisi, AP) succeeded Bülent Ecevit, president of the social-democratic Republican People’s Party (Turkish: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) as Prime Minister. He formed a coalition with the Nationalist Front (Turkish: Milliyetçi Cephe), Necmettin Erbakan‘s fundamentalist National Salvation Party (Turkish: Millî Selamet Partisi, MSP) and Alparslan Türkeş‘ far right Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP). The MHP used the opportunity to infiltrate state security services, seriously aggravating the low-intensity war that was waging between rival factions.
The elections of 1977 had no winner. First, Demirel continued the coalition with the Nationalist Front. But in 1978 Ecevit was able to get to power again with the help of some deputies who had shifted from one party to another. In 1979, Demirel once again became Prime Minister. At the end of the 1970s Turkey was in an unstable situation with unsolved economic and social problems facing strike actions and partial paralysis of politics (the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was unable to elect a President during the six months preceding the coup). Since 1968-69, a proportional representation system made it difficult to find any parliamentary majority. The interests of the industrial bourgeoisie, which held the largest holdings of the country, were opposed by other social classes such as smaller industrialists, traders, rural notables, landlords, whose interests did not always coincide among themselves. Numerous agricultural and industrial reforms requested by parts of the middle upper classes were blocked by others. Henceforth, the politicians seemed unable to combat the growing violence in the country.
Unprecedented political violence had erupted in Turkey in the late 1970s. The overall death toll of the 1970s is estimated at 5,000, with nearly ten assassinations per day. Most were members of left-wing and right-wing political organizations, then engaged in bitter fighting. The ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves, youth organisation of the MHP, claimed they were supporting the security forces. According to the British Searchlight magazine, in 1978 there were 3,319 fascist attacks, in which 831 were killed and 3,121 wounded. In the central trial against the left-wing organization Devrimci Yol (Revolutionary Path) at Ankara Military Court the defendants listed 5,388 political killings before the military coup. Among the victims were 1,296 right-wingers and 2,109 left-wingers. The others could not clearly be related. The 1978 Bahçelievler Massacre, the 1977 Taksim Square massacre with 35 victims and the 1978 Kahramanmaraş Massacre with over 100 victims are some notable incidents. Martial law was announced following the Kahramanmaraş Massacre in 14 of (then) 67 provinces in December 1978. At the time of the coup martial law had been extended to 20 provinces.
Ecevit was warned about the coming coup in June 1979 by Nuri Gündeş of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT). Ecevit then told his interior minister, İrfan Özaydınlı, who then told Sedat Celasun—one of the five generals who would lead the coup. The deputy undersecretary of the MİT, Nihat Yıldız, was demoted to the London consulate and replaced by a lieutenant general as a result.
On 11 September 1979, General Kenan Evren ordered a hand-written report from full general Haydar Saltık on whether or not a coup was in order, or if the government merely needed a stern warning. The report, which recommended preparing for a coup, was delivered in six months. Evren kept the report in his office safe. Evren says the only other person beside Saltık who was aware of the details was Nurettin Ersin. It has been argued that this was a ploy on Evren’s part to encompass the political spectrum as Saltık was close to the left, while Ersin took care of the right. Backlash from political organizations after the coup would thereby be prevented.
On 21 December, the War Academy generals convened to decide the course of action. The pretext for the coup was to put an end to the social conflicts of the 1970s, as well as the parliamentary instability. They resolved to issue the party leaders (Süleyman Demirel and Bülent Ecevit) a memorandum by way of the president, Fahri Korutürk, which was done on 27 December. The leaders received the letter a week later.
A second report, submitted in March 1980, recommended undertaking the coup without further delay, otherwise apprehensive lower-ranked officers might be tempted to “take the matter into their own hands”. Evren made only minor amendments to Saltık’s plan, titled “Operation Flag” (Turkish: Bayrak Harekâtı).
The coup was planned to take place on 11 July 1980, but was postponed after a motion to put Demirel’s government to a vote of confidence was rejected on 2 July. At the Supreme Military Council meeting (Turkish: Yüksek Askeri Şura) on August 26, a second date was proposed: September 12.
On 7 September 1980, Evren and the four service commanders decided that they would overthrow the civilian government. On September 12, the National Security Council (Turkish: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu, MGK), headed by Evren declared coup d’état on the national channel. The MGK then extended martial law throughout the country, abolished the Parliament and the government, suspended the Constitution and banned all political parties and trade unions. They invoked the Kemalist tradition of state secularism and in the unity of the nation, which had already justified the precedent coups, and presented themselves as opposed to communism, fascism, separatism and religious sectarianism.
One of the coup’s most visible effects was on the economy. On the day of the coup, it was on the verge of collapse, with three digit inflation. There was large-scale unemployment, and a chronic foreign trade deficit. The economic changes between 1980 and 1983 were credited to Turgut Özal, who was the main person responsible for the economic policy by the Demirel administration since January 24, 1980. Özal supported the IMF, and to this end he forced the resignation of the director of the Central Bank, İsmail Aydınoğlu, who opposed it.
The strategic aim was to unite Turkey with the “global economy,” which big business supported, and gave Turkish companies the ability to market products and services globally. One month after the coup, London’s International Banking Review wrote “A feeling of hope is evident among international bankers that Turkey’s military coup may have opened the way to greater political stability as an essential prerequisite for the revitalization of the Turkish economy”. During 1980-1983, the foreign exchange rate was allowed to float freely. Foreign investment was encouraged. The national establishments, initiated by Ataturk reforms, were promoted to involve joint enterprises with foreign establishments. The 85% pre-coup level government involvement in the economy forced a reduction in the relative importance of the state sector. Just after the coup, Turkey revitalized the Atatürk Dam and the Southeastern Anatolia Project, which was a land reform project promoted as a solution to the underdeveloped Southeastern Anatolia. It was transformed into a multi-sector social and economic development program, a sustainable development program, for the 9 million people of the region. The closed economy, produced for only Turkey’s need, was subsidized for a vigorous export drive.
The drastic expansion of the economy during this period was relative to the previous level. The GDP remained well below those of most Middle Eastern and European countries. Some undesirable results were the freezing of wages, a significant decrease of the public sector, a deflationist policy, and several successive mini-devaluations.
The coup rounded up members of both the left and right for trial with military tribunals. Within a very short time, there were 250,000650,000 people detained. Among the detainess, 230,000 were tried, 14,000 were stripped of citizenship, and 50 were executed. In addition, hundreds of thousands of people were tortured, and thousands are still missing. A total of 1,683,000 people were blacklisted. Apart from the militants killed during shootings, at least four prisoners were legally executed immediately after the coup; the first ones since 1972, while in February 1982 there were 108 prisoners condemned to capital punishment. Among the prosecuted were Ecevit, Demirel, Türkeş, and Erbakan, who were incarcerated and temporarily suspended from politics.
One notable victim of the hangings was a 17-year-old Erdal Eren, who said he looked forward to it in order to avoid thinking of the torture he had witnessed.
After having taken advantage of the Grey Wolves’ activism, General Kenan Evren imprisoned hundreds of them. At the time they were some 1700 Grey Wolves organizations in Turkey, with about 200,000 registered members and a million sympathizers. In its indictment of the MHP in May 1981, the Turkish military government charged 220 members of the MHP and its affiliates for 694 murders. Evren and his cohorts realized that Türkeş was a charismatic leader who could challenge their authority using the paramilitary Grey Wolves. Following the coup in Colonel Türkeş’s indictment, the Turkish press revealed the close links maintained by the MHP with security forces as well as organized crime involved in drug trade, which financed in return weapons and the activities of hired fascist commandos all over the country.
Within three years the generals passed some 800 laws in order to form a militarily disciplined society. The coup members were convinced of the unworkability of the existing constitution. They decided to adopt a new constitution that included mechanisms to prevent what they saw as impeding the functioning of democracy. On 29 June 1981 the military junta appointed 160 people as members of an advisory assembly to draft a new constitution. The new constitution brought clear limits and definitions, such as on the rules of election of the president, which was stated as a factor for the coup d’état.
On 7 November 1982 the new constitution was put to a referendum, which was accepted with 92% of the vote. On 9 November 1982 Kenan Evren was appointed President for the next seven years.
After the approval by referendum of the new Constitution in June 1982, Kenan Evren organized general elections, held on 6 November 1983. This transition to democracy has been criticized by the Turkish scholar Ergun Özbudun as a “textbook case” of a junta’s dictating the terms of its departure.
The referendum and the elections did not take place in a free and competitive setting. Many political leaders of pre-coup era (including Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit, Alparslan Türkeş and Necmettin Erbakan) had been banned from politics, and all new parties needed to get the approval of the National Security Council in order to participate in the elections. Only 3 parties, two of which were actually created by the junta were permitted to contest.
The secretary general of the National Security Council was general Haydar Saltık. Both he and Evren were the strong men of the regime, while the government was headed by a retired admiral, Bülent Ulusu, and included several retired military officers and a few civil servants. Some alleged in Turkey, after the coup, that general Saltuk had been preparing a more radical, rightist coup, which had been one of the reason prompting the other generals to act, respecting the hierarchy, and then to include him in the MGK in order to neutralize him.
Yildirim Akbulut became the head of the Parliament. He was succeeded in 1991 by Mesut Yılmaz. Meanwhile, Süleyman Demirel founded the center-right True Path Party in 1983, and returned to active politics after the 1987 Turkish referendum.
Yılmaz redoubled Turkey’s economic profile, converting towns like Gaziantep from small provincial capitals into mid-sized economic boomtowns, and renewed its orientation toward Europe. But political instability followed as the host of banned politicians reentered politics, fracturing the vote, and the Motherland Party became increasingly corrupt. Ozal, who succeeded Evren as President of Turkey, died of a heart attack in 1993 and Süleyman Demirel was elected president.
The Özal government empowered the police force with intelligence capabilities to counter the National Intelligence Organization, which at the time was run by the military. The police force even engaged in external intelligence collection.
 American involvement
See also: Covert U.S. regime change actions
The command structure of the stay-behind forces, as suggested in Field Manual 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces. The Host Country in this case is Turkey.
Recognizing the power vacuum in Europe after World War II, President Harry S. Truman formulated the Truman Doctrine to prevent European countries from being pulled into the Soviet sphere of influence. As “the West’s easternmost bulwark against communism”, Turkey was an especially “strategic ally in the containment of Soviet communism”. To this end, the United States set up a secret paramilitary network under Operation Gladio whose members were trained to subvert a possible Soviet invasion, and stage false flag attacks that would be pinned on communists. Anti-communist groups were also funded to debilitate communism’s support from within. The name of the Turkish branch of the operation was revealed by Prime Minister Ecevit in 1974 to be the “Counter-Guerrilla“.
Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, Washington had lost its main ally in the region, while the Carter doctrine, formulated on 23 January 1980 stated that the United States would use military force if necessary to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf region. Turkey received large sums of economic aid mainly organized by the OECD and military aid from the NATO but the USA in particular. Between 1979 and 1982 the OECD countries raised $4 billion in economic aid to Turkey.
Washington started developing the Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) in implementation of the Carter doctrine, for a quick intervention in areas outside NATO, particularly in the Persian Gulf, and without having to rely on NATO troops. On 1 October 1979 President Jimmy Carter announced the foundation of the RDF. One day before the military coup of 12 September 1980 some 3,000 American troops of the RDF started a maneuver Anvil Express on Turkish soil. Just before the coup, the general in charge of the Turkish Air Forces had travelled to the United States. At the end of 1981 a Turkish-American Defense Council (Turkish: Türk-Amerikan Savunma Konseyi) was founded. Defense Minister Ümit Haluk and Richard Perle, then US Assistant Secretary of Defense international security policy of the new Reagan administration, and the deputy Chief of Staff Necdet Öztorun participated in its first meeting on 27 April 1982. On 9 October 1982 a “Memorandum of Understanding” (Turkish: Mutabakat Belgesi) was signed with a focus of extending airports mainly in the Southeast for military purposed. Such airports were built in the provinces of Batman, Muş, Bitlis, Van and Kars in the south-east.
The U.S. support of this coup was acknowledged by the CIA Ankara station chief Paul Henze. After the government was overthrown, Henze cabled Washington, saying, “our boys [in Ankara] did it.” This has created the impression that the USA stood behind the coup. Henze denied this during a June 2003 interview on CNN Türk‘s Manşet, but two days later Birand presented an interview with Henze recorded in 1997 in which he basically confirmed Mehmet Ali Birand’s story. The US State Department itself announced the coup during the night between 11 and 12 September: the military had phoned the US embassy in Ankara to alert them of the coup an hour in advance.
After the coup, State Security Courts were set up, as prescribed in U.S. Army Field Manual 31-15: Operations Against Irregular Forces (translated into Turkish in 1965 as ST 31-15: Ayaklanmaları Bastırma Harekâtı); the Counter-Guerrilla’s bible. According to senior PKK member Selahattin Çelik, the coup showed “the State Security Courts are a product of the Special Warfare Department and they are assigned the task of restructuring the judicial process to fit the demands of the contra-guerrillas.” The manual instructs the courts “not to condemn the defendants according to the punishments set out for the political crimes, but to administer punishments as severe as those set out for murder and other crimes against the person”. Severe punishments were indeed legion in the wake of the coup.
Imprisoned Grey Wolves members were offered amnesty if they agreed to fight the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the south-east of the country as well as the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). They then went on to fight separatist Kurds, under the guidance of the “Counter-Guerrilla“, killing and torturing thousands in the 1980s, and also carrying “false flag attacks in which the Counter-Guerrilla attacked villages, dressed up as PKK fighters, and raped and executed people randomly”. The dirty war had a toll of 37,000 victims. Retired staff lieutenant colonel Talat Turhan, who has devoted three decades to exposing the Counter-Guerrilla, confirmed that they had engaged in torture, having been a victim in July 1972. In his book Zordur Zorda Gülmek, journalist Oğuz Güven enumerated the methods employed, including but not limited to bastinado, urination, and submersion in sewage.
The Court Case Against Generals Behind Turkey’s 1980 Coup
CIA: The Dark Force Behind the Bloodiest Takeover in Turkish History
It took some time, but now it won’t be long anymore before the lawsuit begins against the military junta behind the 12 September coup in 1980, the bloodiest takeover in Turkish history.
For many years the responsible generals knew themselves protected by article 15 in the constitution, which ruled out their prosecution. The outcome of the referendum September last year brought an end to article 15, causing prosecution to become possible at last.
Retired General Kenan Evren was the leader of the 1980 junta. In a rest home for retired generals somewhere along the Aegean shore, he has dedicated himself to painting nudes and landscapes over the last years, but this carefree pastime seems to have come to an end. Recently prosecutor Murat Demir has been appointed by the chief prosecutor in Ankara to lead the investigation in a lawsuit against him. Demir will deal with the more than 1000 criminal complaints filed against Evren and his fellow generals since the referendum.
Demir says he will first gather evidence, before he has Evren and the others summoned for a statement. However, he has to hurry up. Two generals involved in the 1980 coup passed away already, while Evren has reached the age of 93 by now. Moreover, the other two still living generals of the 1980 junta, former Air force Commander Tahsin Sahinkaya and former Navy Commander Nejat Tümer, are not much younger. So when it comes to time, Demir does not have the luxury of the prosecutors in the ‘Operation Sledgehammer’ probe. That means the lawsuit against the much younger militaries, which have not perpetrated a takeover like Evren, but are accused of having planned one in 2002. Demir sees himself confronted with a much tighter time schedule than his colleagues. If he does not want to prosecute three deceased generals, he has to speed things up. Another complicating factor is that Evren made it quite clear already that he will commit suicide rather than being dragged before a judge.
Demir’s focus is on the period between 12 September 1980, the day of the coup, and November 1983. So his investigation is not aimed at those who were paving the way for the takeover during the seventies. Like Paul Henze, the station chief of the American intelligence service CIA. Although Henze left his post just before the coup to become security advisor of American President Jimmy Carter, he has often been mentioned as the dark force behind the 1980 coup. Henze instigated much of the political violence in the years before the takeover. Not an unimportant contribution, since the chaos following on political violence was the main argument for the generals to take control. The fascist Grey Wolves, the Counter-Guerrilla unit and the national intelligence service MIT were the operational forces in the creation of this violence, but it was CIA puppet master Henze who gave the orders. The testimony of a Grey Wolve on a later date says it all: ‘With the provocations by the MIT and the CIA the ground was prepared for the September 12 coup’.
Jimmy Carter phoned Paul Henze after the American President had been informed about the events in Turkey. ‘Your people have made a coup!’, Carter said. Henze confirmed with great enthusiasm: ‘Our boys have done it!’ Later on Carter explained: ‘Before the September 12 movement [sic], Turkey was in a critical situation with regard to its defenses. After the intervention in Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, the movement for stabilization in Turkey came as a relief to us’. The takeover did not come as a total surprise for Carter however. This appears from a statement by his National Security Advisor Zbigniev Brzezinski made before the takeover: ‘For Turkey a military government would be the best solution’.
The 1980 junta’s claim was to terminate the political violence on the streets of Turkey; the political violence the CIA had been masterminding. The violence did not really come to an end though, for the regime merely transferred it from street to prison. Thousands were tortured there, in many cases to death. Dozens were executed and even up to the present day numerous victims are still missing. Moreover, more than half a million Turks were arrested, of which 230.000 were sentenced, often during mass trials. Especially leftish activists and associates of trade unions were imprisoned for prolonged periods. 14.000 Turks lost their nationality, while 85.000 criminal complaints with respect to ‘wrong ideas’ were filed. A total of 39 tons of books went up in flames and eight newspapers were closed. These crimes took place under the responsibility of Kenan Evren and the other four generals, but directly followed from the ‘strategy of tension’ as practiced by the CIA in the previous years.
The thought of a Turkish prosecutor going after Paul Henze and the CIA is bordering to surrealism of course. For several reasons. It is quite unlikely that Ankara wants to jeopardize its good relations with Washington by putting any blame on the CIA for the 1980 takeover. Besides, there is the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen. Although residing in Saylorsburg, Pennsylvania, he is considered to be very close to the ruling AK-party in Turkey. Opponents of Gülen from several directions have come up with valid reasons to assume strong ties between Gülen and the CIA. This makes it unlikely that he wants to see the CIA accused for the 1980 coup.
Gülen’s position towards the 1980 takeover was ambiguous. It has been said that he was on the list of the militaries to be arrested and that he went into hiding for that reason. But this is hardly conclusive information, for many others in favor of the coup were in fact also arrested. Evren even had many Grey Wolves arrested, as well as their infamous leader Alparslan Türkes. To much of their frustration one may add, since these terrorists considered the takeover could not have taken place without their assistance. It was a typical characteristic of Evren, who was not taking chances. To prevent any risk he simply had everyone arrested recognized by him as a possible risk, whether friend or foe.
Anyway, what counts is that Gülen showed himself quite positive about the takeover shortly afterwards. He once even made the remark that Evren deserved ‘a place in heaven’. In nowadays Turkey one should not criticize Gülen too loud in this respect. The journalist Ahmet Sik referred to such matters as well in his unpublished book The Imam’s Army. And he was subsequently arrested on the accusation of being a member of Ergenekon, a clandestine organization that was accused of conspiring against the AK-party government. A few years ago the case against Ergenekon to rule out another takeover in Turkey was still genuine. But by now many agree that the AK-party has a double agenda and uses Ergenekon as an argument to get rid of troublesome opposition.
So, should the people of Turkey be satisfied with the upcoming prosecution of Kenan Evren? In other words, what is the use of prosecuting a 93-year old man in a country where the wheels of justice are known to turn exceedingly slow? Even when he’s still alive at the time a judge is ready to come to a verdict, one can have objections to the idea. There are other and probably better ways to deal with this dark page of Turkish history, that’s for sure. A truth commission to reveal the still hidden facts about the 1980 coup would be better. Certainly for the victims of Evren who survived his takeover, or for the relatives of the ones who didn’t. For they want to know all the facts which lead to their tragedy. But not for the AK-party, because such an investigation could easily lead into directions Erdogan and the likes don’t want to know of. For after all, did Evren not open the way to further politicization of Islam out of fear for the socialist movement in Turkey? Right wing Fethullah Gülen wasn’t positive about the 1980 junta for no reason. The AK-party has more than one reason to be grateful to Evren, since under the general’s supervision more mosques were built and more religious schools opened their doors than in previous years. Besides, the businessmen in the Gülen-movement would make fortunes under Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who was allowed by Evren to bring Turkey on the path of a semi-democracy under his own presidency.
All of this came to a change last year, when Gülen’s AK-party was in need of public support for the referendum. The main purpose of the referendum was the extension of the AK-party’s power in Turkey. Especially over to the institutions that were considered as an obstacle in that respect, like the judiciary and the Constitutional Court. However, prosecution of the remaining members of the 12 September junta became a prime argument in the quest for public acceptance of the proposed constitutional amendment package. Evren became something like a scapegoat, serving the propaganda campaign of the AK-party. If he would not have been such an advocate of murder and torture in 1980 one would almost feel sorry for the geezer.
One Response to The Court Case Against Generals Behind Turkey’s 1980 Coup
- Buddy Snelson says:
The attitude of the then President of the United State “Carter” when he said ‘For Turkey a military government would be the best solution’.should be remembered, as it shows that the leadership of the USA is not at all concerned that the Turkish people have a democratic government or not. All America was and is concerned about is, what is best for America’s own interest. This applies to all situations whether it be in Iraq, Afghanistan or Egypt.
So what hope have the citizens of Cyprus and its refugees in waiting of receiving a just settlement of the illegal occupation of Cyprus. NONE.
Then we wonder why, when people take up arms to correct what is wrong and violence explodes.
Our own lack of the use of democratic principles leads to the growth of terrorism. Instead of pointing our fingers at the Islamic countries in condemnation we should look in our mirrors and point to ourselves.